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Publication
640views
15 years 3 months ago
Foundations of Mechanism Design: A Tutorial - Part 1: Key Concepts and Classical Results
Foundations of Mechanism Design: A Tutorial - Part 1: Key Concepts and Classical Results
Dinesh Garg, Y Narahari, Sujit Gujar

Publication
580views
15 years 3 months ago
Redistribution of VCG Payments in Assignment of Heterogeneous Objects
In this paper, we seek to design a Groves mechanism for assigning p heterogeneous objects among n competing agents (n > p) with unit demand, satisfying weak budget balance, in...
Sujit Gujar, Yadati Narahari

Publication
651views
15 years 3 months ago
On Optimal Linear Redistribution of VCG Payments in Assignment of Heterogeneous Objects
There are p heterogeneous objects to be assigned to n competing agents (n > p) each with unit demand. It is required to design a Groves mechanism for this assignment problem s...
Sujit Gujar, Y Narahari