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WINE
2005
Springer

Truth-Telling Reservations

13 years 9 months ago
Truth-Telling Reservations
We present a mechanism for reservations of bursty resources that is both truthful and robust. It consists of option contracts whose pricing structure induces users to reveal the true likelihoods that they will purchase a given resource. Users are also allowed to adjust their options as their likelihood changes. This scheme helps users save cost and the providers to plan ahead so as to reduce the risk of underutilization and overbooking. The mechanism extracts revenue similar to that of a monopoly provider practicing temporal pricing discrimination with a user population whose preference distribution is known in advance. Keywords Mechanism design · Truth-telling · Reservation · Option · Contract · Incentive compatible
Fang Wu, Li Zhang, Bernardo A. Huberman
Added 28 Jun 2010
Updated 28 Jun 2010
Type Conference
Year 2005
Where WINE
Authors Fang Wu, Li Zhang, Bernardo A. Huberman
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