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PODC
2003
ACM

On a network creation game

13 years 9 months ago
On a network creation game
We introduce a novel game that models the creation of Internet-like networks by selfish node-agents without central design or coordination. Nodes pay for the links that they establish, and benefit from short paths to all destinations. We study the Nash equilibria of this game, and prove results suggesting that the “price of anarchy” [4] in this context (the relative cost of the lack of coordination) may be modest. Several interesting extensions are suggested. Keywords Distributed network design, game-theoretic models, Nash equilibria, price of anarchy
Alex Fabrikant, Ankur Luthra, Elitza N. Maneva, Ch
Added 05 Jul 2010
Updated 05 Jul 2010
Type Conference
Year 2003
Where PODC
Authors Alex Fabrikant, Ankur Luthra, Elitza N. Maneva, Christos H. Papadimitriou, Scott Shenker
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