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CANS
2011
Springer

Algebraic Cryptanalysis of the Round-Reduced and Side Channel Analysis of the Full PRINTCipher-48

7 years 10 months ago
Algebraic Cryptanalysis of the Round-Reduced and Side Channel Analysis of the Full PRINTCipher-48
Abstract. In this paper we analyze the recently proposed light-weight block cipher PRINTCipher. Applying algebraic methods and SAT-solving we are able to break 8 rounds of PRINTCipher-48 with only 2 known plaintexts and 9 rounds under some additional assumptions. We show that it is possible to break the full 48-round cipher by assuming a moderate leakage of internal state bits or even just Hamming weights. Such a simulation side-channel attack has practical complexity. We investigate applicability of our method to cryptanalysis of the full PRINTCipher-48.
Stanislav Bulygin, Johannes Buchmann
Added 13 Dec 2011
Updated 13 Dec 2011
Type Journal
Year 2011
Where CANS
Authors Stanislav Bulygin, Johannes Buchmann
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