Algebraic Intruder Deductions

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Algebraic Intruder Deductions
Abstract. Many security protocols fundamentally depend on the algebraic properties of cryptographic operators. It is however difficult to handle these properties when formally analyzing protocols, since basic problems like the equality of terms that represent cryptographic messages are undecidable, even for relatively simple algebraic theories. We present a framework for security protocol analysis that can handle algebraic properties of cryptographic operators in a uniform and modular way. Our framework is based on two ideas: the use of modular rewriting to formalize a generalized equational deduction problem for the Dolev
David A. Basin, Sebastian Mödersheim, Luca Vi
Added 28 Jun 2010
Updated 28 Jun 2010
Type Conference
Year 2005
Where LPAR
Authors David A. Basin, Sebastian Mödersheim, Luca Viganò
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