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2012
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An algorithmic characterization of multi-dimensional mechanisms

9 years 7 months ago
An algorithmic characterization of multi-dimensional mechanisms
We obtain a characterization of feasible, Bayesian, multi-item multi-bidder mechanisms with independent, additive bidders as distributions over hierarchical mechanisms. Combined with cyclic-monotonicity our results provide a complete characterization of feasible, Bayesian Incentive Compatible mechanisms for this setting. Our characterization is enabled by a novel, constructive proof of Border’s theorem [5], and a new generalization of this theorem to independent (but not necessarily identically distributed) bidders, improving upon the results of [6, 12]. For a single item and independent (but not necessarily identically distributed) bidders, we show that any feasible reduced form auction can be implemented as a distribution over hierarchical mechanisms. We also give a polynomial-time algorithm for determining feasibility of a reduced form auction, or providing a separation hyperplane from the set of feasible reduced forms. To complete the picture, we provide polynomialtime algorithm...
Yang Cai, Constantinos Daskalakis, S. Matthew Wein
Added 28 Sep 2012
Updated 28 Sep 2012
Type Journal
Year 2012
Where STOC
Authors Yang Cai, Constantinos Daskalakis, S. Matthew Weinberg
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