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SLOGICA
2008

Applied Logic without Psychologism

9 years 5 months ago
Applied Logic without Psychologism
Logic is a celebrated representation language because of its formal generality. But there are two senses in which a logic may be considered general, one that concerns a technical ability to discriminate between different types of individuals, and another that concerns constitutive norms for reasoning as such. This essay embraces the former, permutation-invariance conception of logic and rejects the latter, Fregean conception of logic. The question of how to apply logic under this pure invariantist view is addressed, and a methodology is given. The pure invariantist view is contrasted with logical pluralism, and a methodology for applied logic is demonstrated in remarks on a variety of issues concerning non-monotonic logic and non-monotonic inference, including Charles Morgan's impossibility results for non-monotonic logic, David Makinson's normative constraints for non-monotonic inference, and Igor Douven and Timothy Williamson's proposed formal constraints on rational a...
Gregory R. Wheeler
Added 15 Dec 2010
Updated 15 Dec 2010
Type Journal
Year 2008
Where SLOGICA
Authors Gregory R. Wheeler
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