Applying learning algorithms to preference elicitation

We consider the parallels between the preference elicitation problem in combinatorial auctions and the problem of learning an unknown function from learning theory. We show that learning algorithms can be used as a basis for preference elicitation algorithms. The resulting elicitation algorithms perform a polynomial number of queries. We also give conditions under which the resulting algorithms have polynomial communication. Our conversion procedure allows us to generate combinatorial auction protocols from learning algorithms for polynomials, monotone DNF, and linear-threshold functions. In particular, we obtain an algorithm that elicits XOR bids with polynomial communication. Categories and Subject Descriptors F.2.0 [Analysis of Algorithms and Problem Complexity]: General; J.4 [Social and Behavioral Sciences]: Economics; I.2.6 [Artificial Intelligence]: Learning General Terms Algorithms, Economics, Theory Keywords combinatorial auctions, preference elicitation, learning

• Type: Conference
• Year: 2004
• Where: SIGECOM
• Authors: Sébastien Lahaie, David C. Parkes
• Keywords: Algorithms, Elicitation Algorithms, Preference Elicitation, SIGECOM 2004