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9

SACRYPT
2005
Springer

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An Attack on CFB Mode Encryption as Used by OpenPGP

13 years 10 months ago

An Attack on CFB Mode Encryption as Used by OpenPGP

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This paper describes an adaptive-chosen-ciphertext attack on the Cipher Feedback (CFB) mode of encryption as used in OpenPGP. In most circumstances it will allow an attacker to determine 16 bits of any block of plaintext with about 215 oracle queries for the initial setup work and 215 oracle queries for each block. Standard CFB mode encryption does not appear to be aﬀected by this attack. It applies to a particular variation of CFB used by OpenPGP. In particular it exploits an ad-hoc integrity check feature in OpenPGP which was meant as a “quick check” to determine the correctness of the decrypting symmetric key.

Serge Mister, Robert J. Zuccherato

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Ad-hoc Integrity Check | CFB Mode Encryption | Oracle Queries | SACRYPT 2005 |

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Added	28 Jun 2010
Updated	28 Jun 2010
Type	Conference
Year	2005
Where	SACRYPT
Authors	Serge Mister, Robert J. Zuccherato

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