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2004
Springer

Auction Equilibrium Strategies for Task Allocation in Uncertain Environments

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Auction Equilibrium Strategies for Task Allocation in Uncertain Environments
Abstract. In this paper we address a model of self interested information agents competing to perform tasks. The agents are situated in an uncertain environment while different tasks dynamically arrive from a central manager. The agents differ in their capabilities to perform a task under different world states. Previous models concerning cooperative agents aiming for a joint goal are not applicable in such environments, since self interested agents have a motivation to deviate from the joint allocation strategy, in order to increase their own benefits. Given the allocation protocol set by the central manager, a stable solution, is a set of strategies, derived from an equilibrium where no agent can benefit from changing its strategy given the other agents' strategies. Specifically we focus on a protocol in which, upon arrival of a new task, the central manager starts a reverse auction among the agents, and the agent who bids the lowest cost wins. We introduce the model, formulate ...
David Sarne, Meirav Hadad, Sarit Kraus
Added 20 Aug 2010
Updated 20 Aug 2010
Type Conference
Year 2004
Where CIA
Authors David Sarne, Meirav Hadad, Sarit Kraus
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