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ECAI
2006
Springer

An Automated Agent for Bilateral Negotiation with Bounded Rational Agents with Incomplete Information

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An Automated Agent for Bilateral Negotiation with Bounded Rational Agents with Incomplete Information
Many day-to-day tasks require negotiation, mostly under conditions of incomplete information. In particular, the opponent's exact tradeoff between different offers is usually unknown. We propose a model of an automated negotiation agent capable of negotiating with a bounded rational agent (and in particular, against humans) under conditions of incomplete information. Although we test our agent in one specific domain, the agent's architecture is generic; thus it can be adapted to any domain as long as the negotiators' preferences can be expressed in additive utilities. Our results indicate that the agent played significantly better, including reaching a higher proportion of agreements, than human counterparts when playing one of the sides, while when playing the other side there was no significant difference between the results of the agent and the human players.
Raz Lin, Sarit Kraus, Jonathan Wilkenfeld, James B
Added 22 Aug 2010
Updated 22 Aug 2010
Type Conference
Year 2006
Where ECAI
Authors Raz Lin, Sarit Kraus, Jonathan Wilkenfeld, James Barry
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