Sciweavers

GLOBECOM
2009
IEEE

Bargaining to Improve Channel Sharing between Selfish Cognitive Radios

13 years 7 months ago
Bargaining to Improve Channel Sharing between Selfish Cognitive Radios
We consider a problem where two selfish cognitive radio users try to share two channels on which they each have potentially different valuations. We first formulate the problem as a non-cooperative simultaneous game, and identify its equilibria. For cases where the resulting Nash equilibria are not efficient, we then propose a novel coordinated channel access mechanism that can be implemented with low overhead in a decentralized fashion. This mechanism, based on the Nash bargaining solution, guarantees full utilization of the spectrum resources while improving the utility of each user compared to the non-cooperative setting. We quantify the resulting gains. Finally, we prove that risk-averse users that are willing to accept offered information at face value have no incentive to lie to each other about their valuations for the non-cooperative game. However, we find that truthfulness is not guaranteed in the bargaining process, suggesting as an open problem the design of an incentive com...
Hua Liu, Allen B. MacKenzie, Bhaskar Krishnamachar
Added 16 Aug 2010
Updated 16 Aug 2010
Type Conference
Year 2009
Where GLOBECOM
Authors Hua Liu, Allen B. MacKenzie, Bhaskar Krishnamachari
Comments (0)