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IAT
2008
IEEE

Bargaining in Markets with One-Sided Competition: Model and Analysis

13 years 10 months ago
Bargaining in Markets with One-Sided Competition: Model and Analysis
The automation of agents that bargain within markets is a challenging open problem. In these settings a seller agent can take advantage from the competition among several buyer agents and vice versa. In this paper we focus on one-sided competition situations wherein there are one seller and several buyers (the analysis of the reverse situations is analogous). We provide two original contributions. Firstly, we extend state-of-the-art models to satisfactorily capture competition among buyers. More precisely, we enrich the alternating-offers protocol by allowing the seller agent to exploit the outside option, namely, the option to leave the negotiation she is carrying on and choose a different buyer with whom to negotiate. Secondly, we provide a preliminary game theoretical analysis both to develop an efficient solving algorithm and to show the effectiveness of the employment of the outside option in bargaining.
Nicola Gatti
Added 29 May 2010
Updated 29 May 2010
Type Conference
Year 2008
Where IAT
Authors Nicola Gatti
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