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ALDT
2015
Springer

Beyond Plurality: Truth-Bias in Binary Scoring Rules

4 years 10 months ago
Beyond Plurality: Truth-Bias in Binary Scoring Rules
It is well known that standard game-theoretic approaches to voting mechanisms lead to a multitude of Nash Equilibria (NE), many of which are counter-intuitive. We focus on truth-biased voters, a model recently proposed to avoid such issues. The model introduces an incentive for voters to be truthful when their vote is not pivotal. This is a powerful refinement, and recent simulations reveal that the surviving equilibria tend to have desirable properties. However, truth-bias has been studied only within the context of plurality, which is
Svetlana Obraztsova, Omer Lev, Evangelos Markakis,
Added 15 Apr 2016
Updated 15 Apr 2016
Type Journal
Year 2015
Where ALDT
Authors Svetlana Obraztsova, Omer Lev, Evangelos Markakis, Zinovi Rabinovich, Jeffrey S. Rosenschein
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