Cheating by Men in the Gale-Shapley Stable Matching Algorithm

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Cheating by Men in the Gale-Shapley Stable Matching Algorithm
Abstract. This paper addresses strategies for the stable marriage problem. For the Gale-Shapley algorithm with men proposing, a classical theorem states that it is impossible for every cheating man to get a better partner than the one he gets if everyone is truthful. We study how to circumvent this theorem and incite men to cheat. First we devise coalitions in which a non-empty subset of the liars get better partners and no man is worse off than before. This strategy is limited in that not everyone in the coalition has the incentive to falsify his list. In an attempt to rectify this situation we introduce the element of randomness, but the theorem shows surprising robustness: it is impossible that every liar has a chance to improve the rank of his partner while no one gets hurt. To overcome the problem that some men lack the motivation to lie, we exhibit another randomized lying strategy in which every liar can expect to get a better partner on average, though with a chance of getting ...
Chien-Chung Huang
Added 22 Aug 2010
Updated 22 Aug 2010
Type Conference
Year 2006
Where ESA
Authors Chien-Chung Huang
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