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2010

Compilation Complexity of Common Voting Rules

8 years 11 months ago
Compilation Complexity of Common Voting Rules
In computational social choice, one important problem is to take the votes of a subelectorate (subset of the voters), and summarize them using a small number of bits. This needs to be done in such a way that, if all that we know is the summary, as well as the votes of voters outside the subelectorate, we can conclude which of the m alternatives wins. This corresponds to the notion of compilation complexity, the minimum number of bits required to summarize the votes for a particular rule, which was introduced by Chevaleyre et al. [IJCAI-09]. We study three different types of compilation complexity. The first, studied by Chevaleyre et al., depends on the size of the subelectorate but not on the size of the complement (the voters outside the subelectorate). The second depends on the size of the complement but not on the size of the subelectorate. The third depends on both. We first investigate the relations among the three types of compilation complexity. Then, we give upper and lower bo...
Lirong Xia, Vincent Conitzer
Added 29 Oct 2010
Updated 29 Oct 2010
Type Conference
Year 2010
Where AAAI
Authors Lirong Xia, Vincent Conitzer
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