Complexity of terminating preference elicitation

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Complexity of terminating preference elicitation
Complexity theory is a useful tool to study computational issues surrounding the elicitation of preferences, as well as the strategic manipulation of elections aggregating together preferences of multiple agents. We study here the complexity of determining when we can terminate eliciting preferences, and prove that the complexity depends on the elicitation strategy. We show, for instance, that it may be better from a computational perspective to elicit all preferences from one agent at a time than to elicit individual preferences from multiple agents. We also study the connection between the strategic manipulation of an election and preference elicitation. We show that what we can manipulate affects the computational complexity of manipulation. In particular, we prove that there are voting rules which are easy to manipulate if we can change all of an agent's vote, but computationally intractable if we can change only some of their preferences. This suggests that, as with preferen...
Toby Walsh
Added 12 Oct 2010
Updated 12 Oct 2010
Type Conference
Year 2008
Where ATAL
Authors Toby Walsh
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