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SODA
2004
ACM

Computing equilibria for congestion games with (im)perfect information

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Computing equilibria for congestion games with (im)perfect information
We study algorithmic questions concerning a basic microeconomic congestion game in which there is a single provider that offers a service to a set of potential customers. Each customer has a particular demand of service and the behavior of the customers is determined by utility functions that are nonincreasing in the congestion. Customers decide whether to join or leave the service based on the experienced congestion and the offered prices. Following standard game theory, we assume each customer behaves in the most rational way. If the prices of service are fixed, then such a customer behavior leads to a pure, not necessarily unique Nash equilibrium among the customers. In order to evaluate marketing strategies, the service provider is interested in estimating its revenue under the best and worst customer equilibria. We study the complexity of this problem under different models of information available to the provider.
René Beier, Artur Czumaj, Piotr Krysta, Ber
Added 31 Oct 2010
Updated 31 Oct 2010
Type Conference
Year 2004
Where SODA
Authors René Beier, Artur Czumaj, Piotr Krysta, Berthold Vöcking
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