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2004

Computing Nash Equilibria of Action-Graph Games

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Computing Nash Equilibria of Action-Graph Games
Action-graph games (AGGs) are a fully expressive game representation which can compactly express both strict and context-specific independence between players' utility functions. Actions are represented as nodes in a graph G, and the payoff to an agent who chose the action s depends only on the numbers of other agents who chose actions connected to s. We present algorithms for computing both symmetric and arbitrary equilibria of AGGs using a continuation method. We analyze the worst-case cost of computing the Jacobian of the payoff function, the exponential-time bottleneck step, and in all cases achieve exponential speedup. When the indegree of G is bounded by a constant and the game is symmetric, the Jacobian can be computed in polynomial time.
Navin A. R. Bhat, Kevin Leyton-Brown
Added 31 Oct 2010
Updated 31 Oct 2010
Type Conference
Year 2004
Where UAI
Authors Navin A. R. Bhat, Kevin Leyton-Brown
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