Convergence to Equilibrium in Local Interaction Games

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Convergence to Equilibrium in Local Interaction Games
— We study a simple game theoretic model for the spread of an innovation in a network. The diffusion of the innovation is modeled as the dynamics of a coordination game in which the adoption of a common strategy between players has a higher payoff. Classical results in game theory provide a simple condition for an innovation to become widespread in the network. The present paper characterizes the rate of convergence as a function of graph structure. In particular, we derive a dichotomy between well-connected (e.g. random) graphs that show slow convergence and poorly connected, low dimensional graphs that show fast convergence.
Andrea Montanari, Amin Saberi
Added 20 May 2010
Updated 20 May 2010
Type Conference
Year 2009
Where FOCS
Authors Andrea Montanari, Amin Saberi
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