Coordination Mechanisms

13 years 10 months ago

Download www.cs.tau.ac.il

Abstract. We introduce the notion of coordination mechanisms to improve the performance in systems with independent selﬁsh and noncolluding agents. The quality of a coordination mechanism is measured by its price of anarchy—the worst-case performance of a Nash equilibrium over the (centrally controlled) social optimum. We give upper and lower bounds for the price of anarchy for selﬁsh task allocation and congestion games.

George Christodoulou, Elias Koutsoupias, Akash Nan

Real-time Traffic

Coordination Mechanism | ICALP 2004 | Selﬁsh Task Allocation | Theoretical Computer Science | Worst-case Performance |

claim paper

» The Dynamic Selection of Coordination Mechanisms

» PlanCoordination Mechanisms and the Price of Autonomy

» CoMex A Mechanism for Coordination of Task Execution in Group Work

» Integration of Coordination Mechanisms in the BITE MultiRobot Architecture

» A study of mechanisms for improving robotic group performance

» Agent Decision Making for Dynamic Selection of Coordination Mechanisms

» A Dynamic Coordination Mechanism Using Adjustable Autonomy

» A Distributed Rule Mechanism for Multidatabase Systems

Post Info
More Details (n/a)

Added	01 Jul 2010
Updated	01 Jul 2010
Type	Conference
Year	2004
Where	ICALP
Authors	George Christodoulou, Elias Koutsoupias, Akash Nanavati

Comments (0)

Sciweavers

Coordination Mechanisms

Coordination Mechanism | ICALP 2004 | Selﬁsh Task Allocation | Theoretical Computer Science | Worst-case Performance |

Explore & Download

Productivity Tools

Document Tools

Image Tools

Sciweavers