Deniable authentication and key exchange

12 years 3 months ago
Deniable authentication and key exchange
We extend the definitional work of Dwork, Naor and Sahai from deniable authentication to deniable key-exchange protocols. We then use these definitions to prove the deniability features of SKEME and SIGMA, two natural and efficient protocols which serve as basis for the Internet Key Exchange (IKE) protocol. SKEME is an encryption-based protocol for which we prove full deniability based on the plaintext awareness of the underlying encryption scheme. Interestingly SKEME's deniability is possibly the first "natural" application which essentially requires plaintext awareness (until now this notion has been mainly used as a tool for proving chosen-ciphertext security). SIGMA, on the other hand, uses non-repudiable signatures for authentication and hence cannot be proven to be fully deniable. Yet we are able to prove a weaker, but meaningful, "partial deniability" property: a party may not be able to deny that it was "alive" at some point in time but can f...
Mario Di Raimondo, Rosario Gennaro, Hugo Krawczyk
Added 20 Aug 2010
Updated 20 Aug 2010
Type Conference
Year 2006
Where CCS
Authors Mario Di Raimondo, Rosario Gennaro, Hugo Krawczyk
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