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Direct anonymous attestation

9 years 2 months ago
Direct anonymous attestation
This paper describes the direct anonymous attestation scheme (DAA). This scheme was adopted by the Trusted Computing Group as the method for remote authentication of a hardware module, called trusted platform module (TPM), while preserving the privacy of the user of the platform that contains the module. Direct anonymous attestation can be seen as a group signature without the feature that a signature can be opened, i.e., the anonymity is not revocable. Moreover, DAA allows for pseudonyms, i.e., for each signature a user (in agreement with the recipient of the signature) can decide whether or not the signature should be linkable to another signature. DAA furthermore allows for detection of “known” keys: if the DAA secret keys are extracted from a TPM and published, a verifier can detect that a signature was produced using these secret keys. The scheme is provably secure in the random oracle model under the strong RSA and the decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption.
Ernest F. Brickell, Jan Camenisch, Liqun Chen
Added 01 Jul 2010
Updated 01 Jul 2010
Type Conference
Year 2004
Where CCS
Authors Ernest F. Brickell, Jan Camenisch, Liqun Chen
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