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ASIAN
2009
Springer

A Dolev-Yao Model for Zero Knowledge

13 years 4 months ago
A Dolev-Yao Model for Zero Knowledge
In cryptographic protocols, zero knowledge proofs are employed for a principal A to communicate some non-trivial information t to B while at the same time ensuring that B cannot derive any information "stronger" than t. Oen this implies that B can verify that some property holds without being able to produce a proof of this. While a rich theory of zero knowledge proofs exists, there are few formal models addressing verification questions. We propose an extension of the standard Dolev-Yao model of cryptographic protocols which involves not only constructibility of terms but also a form of verifiability. We present a proof system for term derivability, which is employed to yield a decision procedure for checking whether a given protocol meets its zero knowledge specification.
Anguraj Baskar, Ramaswamy Ramanujam, S. P. Suresh
Added 08 Nov 2010
Updated 08 Nov 2010
Type Conference
Year 2009
Where ASIAN
Authors Anguraj Baskar, Ramaswamy Ramanujam, S. P. Suresh
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