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2004
Springer

Efficient Countermeasures against RPA, DPA, and SPA

9 years 3 months ago
Efficient Countermeasures against RPA, DPA, and SPA
In the execution on a smart card, side channel attacks such as simple power analysis (SPA) and the differential power analysis (DPA) have become serious threat [15]. Side channel attacks monitor power consumption and even exploit the leakage information related to power consumption to reveal bits of a secret key d although d is hidden inside a smart card. Almost public key cryptosystems including RSA, DLP-based cryptosystems, and elliptic curve cryptosystems execute an exponentiation algorithm with a secret-key exponent, and they thus suffer from both SPA and DPA. Recently, in the case of elliptic curve cryptosystems, DPA is improved to the Refined Power Analysis (RPA), which exploits a special point with a zero value and reveals a secret key [10]. RPA is further generalized to Zero-value Point Attack (ZPA) [2]. Both RPA and ZPA utilizes a special feature of elliptic curves that happens to have a special point or a register used in addition and doubling formulae with a zero value and t...
Hideyo Mamiya, Atsuko Miyaji, Hiroaki Morimoto
Added 20 Aug 2010
Updated 20 Aug 2010
Type Conference
Year 2004
Where CHES
Authors Hideyo Mamiya, Atsuko Miyaji, Hiroaki Morimoto
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