Sciweavers

Share
WISA
2009
Springer

EM Side-Channel Attacks on Commercial Contactless Smartcards Using Low-Cost Equipment

8 years 9 months ago
EM Side-Channel Attacks on Commercial Contactless Smartcards Using Low-Cost Equipment
We introduce low-cost hardware for performing non-invasive side-channel attacks on Radio Frequency Identication Devices (RFID) and develop techniques for facilitating a correlation power analysis (CPA) in the presence of the eld of an RFID reader. We practically verify the eectiveness of the developed methods by analysing the security of commercial contactless smartcards employing strong cryptography, pinpointing weaknesses in the protocol and revealing a vulnerability towards side-channel attacks. Employing the developed hardware, we present the rst successful key-recovery attack on commercially available contactless smartcards based on the Data Encryption Standard (DES) or TripleDES (3DES) cipher that are widely used for security-sensitive applications, e.g., payment purposes.
Timo Kasper, David Oswald, Christof Paar
Added 27 Jul 2010
Updated 27 Jul 2010
Type Conference
Year 2009
Where WISA
Authors Timo Kasper, David Oswald, Christof Paar
Comments (0)
books