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9

ISAAC
2003
Springer

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Equilibria for Networks with Malicious Users

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Equilibria for Networks with Malicious Users

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We consider the problem of characterizing user equilibria and optimal solutions for selﬁsh routing in a given network. We extend the known models by considering malicious behaviour. While selﬁsh users follow a strategy that minimizes their individual cost, a malicious user will use his ﬂow through the network in an eﬀort to cause the maximum possible damage to this cost. We deﬁne a generalized model, present characterizations of ﬂows at equilibrium and prove bounds for the ratio of the social cost of a ﬂow at equilibrium over the cost when centralized coordination among users is allowed.

George Karakostas, Anastasios Viglas

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ISAAC 2003 | Malicious Behaviour | Maximum Possible Damage | User Equilibria |

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Added	07 Jul 2010
Updated	07 Jul 2010
Type	Conference
Year	2003
Where	ISAAC
Authors	George Karakostas, Anastasios Viglas

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