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2012

Evaluating Resistance to False-Name Manipulations in Elections

7 years 16 days ago
Evaluating Resistance to False-Name Manipulations in Elections
In many mechanisms (especially online mechanisms), a strategic agent can influence the outcome by creating multiple false identities. We consider voting settings where the mechanism designer cannot completely prevent false-name manipulation, but may use false-name-limiting methods such as CAPTCHAs to influence the amount and characteristics of such manipulation. Such a designer would prefer, first, a high probability of obtaining the “correct” outcome, and second, a statistical method for evaluating the correctness of the outcome. In this paper, we focus on settings with two alternatives. We model voters as independently drawing a number of identities from a distribution that may be influenced by the choice of the false-name-limiting method. We give a criterion for the evaluation and comparison of these distributions. Then, given the results of an election in which false-name manipulation may have occurred, we propose and justify a statistical test for evaluating the outcome.
Bo Waggoner, Lirong Xia, Vincent Conitzer
Added 29 Sep 2012
Updated 29 Sep 2012
Type Journal
Year 2012
Where AAAI
Authors Bo Waggoner, Lirong Xia, Vincent Conitzer
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