Experimental Market Mechanism Design for Double Auction

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In this paper, we introduce an experimental approach to the design, analysis and implementation of market mechanisms based on double auction. We deﬁne a formal market model that speciﬁes the market policies in a double auction market. Based on this model, we introduce a set of criteria for the evaluation of market mechanisms. We design and implement a set of market policies and test them with different experimental settings. The results of experiments provide us a better understanding of the interrelationship among market policies and also show that an experimental approach can greatly improve the efﬁciency and effectiveness of market mechanism design.

Masabumi Furuhata, Laurent Perrussel, Jean-Marc Th

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Added	25 May 2010
Updated	25 May 2010
Type	Conference
Year	2009
Where	AUSAI
Authors	Masabumi Furuhata, Laurent Perrussel, Jean-Marc Thévenin, Dongmo Zhang

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Experimental Market Mechanism Design for Double Auction

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