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2005
Springer

Exploiting Empirical Engagement in Authentication Protocol Design

10 years 13 days ago
Exploiting Empirical Engagement in Authentication Protocol Design
We develop the theme of an earlier paper [3], namely that security protocols for pervasive computing frequently need to exploit empirical channels and that the latter can be classified by variants of the Dolev-Yao attacker model. We refine this classification of channels and study three protocols in depth: two from our earlier paper and one new one.
Sadie Creese, Michael Goldsmith, Richard Harrison,
Added 28 Jun 2010
Updated 28 Jun 2010
Type Conference
Year 2005
Where SPC
Authors Sadie Creese, Michael Goldsmith, Richard Harrison, Bill Roscoe, Paul Whittaker, Irfan Zakiuddin
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