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2010
ACM

Expressive auctions for externalities in online advertising

11 years 6 months ago
Expressive auctions for externalities in online advertising
When online ads are shown together, they compete for user attention and conversions, imposing negative externalities on each other. While the competition for user attention in sponsored search can be captured via models of clickthrough rates, the post-click competition for conversions cannot: since the value-per-click of an advertiser is proportional to the conversion probability conditional on a click, which depends on the other ads displayed, the private value of an advertiser is no longer one-dimensional, and the GSP mechanism is not adequately expressive. We study the design of expressive GSP-like mechanisms for the simplest form that an advertiser’s private value can have in the presence of such externalities— an advertiser’s value depends on exclusivity, i.e., whether her ad is shown exclusively, or along with other ads. Our auctions take as input two-dimensional (per-click) bids for exclusive and nonexclusive display, and have two types of outcomes: either a single ad is ...
Arpita Ghosh, Amin Sayedi
Added 14 May 2010
Updated 14 May 2010
Type Conference
Year 2010
Where WWW
Authors Arpita Ghosh, Amin Sayedi
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