Sciweavers

ATAL
2006
Springer

False-name-proof combinatorial auction protocol: Groves Mechanism with SubModular Approximation

13 years 7 months ago
False-name-proof combinatorial auction protocol: Groves Mechanism with SubModular Approximation
This paper develops a new combinatorial auction protocol called the Groves Mechanism with SubModular Approximation (GM-SMA). This protocol satisfies the following characteristics: (1) it is false-name-proof, (2) each winner is included in a Pareto efficient allocation, and (3) as long as a Pareto efficient allocation is achieved, the protocol is robust against the collusion of losers and the outcome is in the core. As far as the authors are aware, the GM-SMA is the first protocol that satisfies all three of these characteristics. The basic ideas of the GM-SMA are as follows: (i) It is based on the VCG protocol, i.e., the payment of a winner in this protocol is identical to the payment in one instance of the Groves mechanism, which is a class of protocols that includes the VCG. (ii) When calculating the payment of a bidder, we approximate the valuations of other bidders by using a submodular valuation function (submodular approximation). Simulation results show that the GM-SMA achieves...
Makoto Yokoo, Toshihiro Matsutani, Atsushi Iwasaki
Added 20 Aug 2010
Updated 20 Aug 2010
Type Conference
Year 2006
Where ATAL
Authors Makoto Yokoo, Toshihiro Matsutani, Atsushi Iwasaki
Comments (0)