A Formal Analysis for Capturing Replay Attacks in Cryptographic Protocols

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Abstract. We present a reduction semantics for the LYSA calculus extended with session information, for modelling cryptographic protocols, and a static analysis for it. If a protocol passes the analysis then it is free of replay attacks and thus preserves freshness. The analysis has been implemented and applied to a number of protocols, including both original and corrected version of Needham-Schroeder protocol. The experiment results show that the analysis is able to capture potential replay attacks.

Han Gao, Chiara Bodei, Pierpaolo Degano, Hanne Rii

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Algorithms | Analysis | ASIAN 2007 | Potential Replay Attacks | Replay Attacks |

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Added	07 Jun 2010
Updated	07 Jun 2010
Type	Conference
Year	2007
Where	ASIAN
Authors	Han Gao, Chiara Bodei, Pierpaolo Degano, Hanne Riis Nielson

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A Formal Analysis for Capturing Replay Attacks in Cryptographic Protocols

Algorithms | Analysis | ASIAN 2007 | Potential Replay Attacks | Replay Attacks |

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