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ACSW
2006

Formal analysis of secure contracting protocol for e-tendering

13 years 6 months ago
Formal analysis of secure contracting protocol for e-tendering
Formal specification and verification of protocols have been credited for uncovering protocol flaws; revealing inadequacies in protocol design of the Initial Stage and Negotiation Stage; and proved that improved protocol performs in the desired manner while under modelled attacks from dishonest players. It also shows how formal methods can be used by protocol designer to achieve a better design of a complex sysmal methods can also populate an abstract concept with a more complete and consistent protocol specification. Complex system protocol can be easily specified with simplifying assumptions for a high level of protocol verification. This set of assumptions can then be used to further explore the protocol. Using formal methods for complex secure system protocol design will provide not only better quality protocol but could also be the first step in advancing an abstract concept to a more practical stage for development.
Rong Du, Ernest Foo, Colin Boyd, Kim-Kwang Raymond
Added 30 Oct 2010
Updated 30 Oct 2010
Type Conference
Year 2006
Where ACSW
Authors Rong Du, Ernest Foo, Colin Boyd, Kim-Kwang Raymond Choo
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