Founding Cryptography on Tamper-Proof Hardware Tokens

A number of works have investigated using tamper-proof hardware tokens as tools to achieve a variety of cryptographic tasks. In particular, Goldreich and Ostrovsky considered the goal of software protection via oblivious RAM. Goldwasser, Kalai, and Rothblum introduced the concept of one-time programs: in a one-time program, an honest sender sends a set of simple hardware tokens to a (potentially malicious) receiver. The hardware tokens allow the receiver to execute a secret program specified by the sender’s tokens exactly once (or, more generally, up to a fixed t times). A recent line of work initiated by Katz examined the problem of achieving UC-secure computation using hardware tokens. Motivated by the goal of unifying and strengthening these previous notions, we consider the general question of basing secure computation on hardware tokens. We show that the following tasks, which cannot be realized in the “plain” model, become feasible if the parties are allowed to generate ...

• Type: Conference
• Year: 2010
• Where: TCC
• Authors: Vipul Goyal, Yuval Ishai, Amit Sahai, Ramarathnam Venkatesan, Akshay Wadia
• Keywords: Cryptography, Hardware Tokens, Secure Computation, Tamper-proof Hardware Tokens, TCC 2010