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CORR
2008
Springer

Game Theory with Costly Computation

8 years 3 months ago
Game Theory with Costly Computation
We develop a general game-theoretic framework for reasoning about strategic agents performing possibly costly computation. In this framework, many traditional game-theoretic results (such as the existence of a Nash equilibrium) no longer hold. Nevertheless, we can use the framework to provide psychologically appealing explanations to observed behavior in wellstudied games (such as finitely repeated prisoner's dilemma and rock-paper-scissors). Furthermore, we provide natural conditions on games sufficient to guarantee that equilibria exist. As an application of this framework, we consider a notion of game-theoretic implementation of mediators in computational games. We show that a special case of this notion is equivalent to a variant of the traditional cryptographic definition of protocol security; this result shows that, when taking computation into account, the two approaches used for dealing with "deviating" players in two different communities--Nash equilibrium in g...
Joseph Y. Halpern, Rafael Pass
Added 09 Dec 2010
Updated 09 Dec 2010
Type Journal
Year 2008
Where CORR
Authors Joseph Y. Halpern, Rafael Pass
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