High-order punishment and the evolution of cooperation

The Prisoner's Dilemma and the Public Goods Game are models to study mechanisms leading to the evolution of cooperation. From a simplified rational and egoistic perspective there should be no altruistic cooperation in these games at all. Previous studies observed circumstances under which cooperation can emerge. This paper demonstrates that high-order punishment opportunities can maintain a higher cooperation level in an agent based simulation of the evolution of cooperation. Categories and Subject Descriptors H.4 [Information Systems Applications]: Miscellaneous; I.2.1 [Computing Methodologies]: Artificial IntelligenceApplications and Expert Systems[Games]; I.2.11 [Computing Methodologies]: Artificial Intelligence--Distributed Artificial Intelligence, Intelligent agents General Terms Experimentation Keywords IPD, Public Goods Game, Cooperation, Punishment

• Type: Conference
• Year: 2006
• Where: GECCO
• Authors: Bastian Baranski, Thomas Bartz-Beielstein, Rüdiger Ehlers, Thusinthan Kajendran, Björn Kosslers, Jörn Mehnen, Tomasz Polaszek, Ralf Reimholz, Jens Schmidt, Karlheinz Schmitt, Danny Seis, Rafael Slodzinski, Simon Steeg, Nils Wiemann, Marc Zimmermann
• Keywords: Altruistic Cooperation, Computing Methodologies, GECCO 2006, Optimization, Studies Observed Circumstances