Improving Integral Attacks Against Rijndael-256 Up to 9 Rounds

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Improving Integral Attacks Against Rijndael-256 Up to 9 Rounds
Rijndael is a block cipher designed by V. Rijmen and J. Daemen and it was chosen in its 128-bit block version as AES by the NIST in October 2000. Three key lengths - 128, 192 or 256 bits - are allowed. In the original contribution describing Rijndael [4], two other versions have been described: Rijndael-256 and Rijndael-192 that respectively use plaintext blocks of length 256 bits and 192 bits under the same key lengths and that have been discarded by the NIST. This paper presents an efficient distinguisher between 4 inner rounds of Rijndael-256 and a random permutation of the blocks space, by exploiting the existence of semi-bijective and Integral properties induced by the cipher. We then present three attacks based upon the 4 rounds distinguisher against 7, 8 and 9 rounds versions of Rijndael-256 using the extensions proposed by N. ferguson et al. in [6]. The best cryptanalysis presented here works against 9 rounds of Rijndael-256 under a 192-bit key and requires 2128 − 2119 chosen...
Samuel Galice, Marine Minier
Added 01 Jun 2010
Updated 01 Jun 2010
Type Conference
Year 2008
Authors Samuel Galice, Marine Minier
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