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IROS
2006
IEEE

Improving Sequential Single-Item Auctions

9 years 5 months ago
Improving Sequential Single-Item Auctions
— We study how to improve sequential single-item auctions that assign targets to robots for exploration tasks such as environmental clean-up, space-exploration, and search and rescue missions. We exploit the insight that the resulting travel distances are small if the bidding and winner-determination rules are designed to result in hillclimbing, namely to assign an additional target to a robot in each round of the sequential single-item auction so that the team cost increases the least. We study the impact of increasing the lookahead of hillclimbing and using roll-outs to improve the evaluation of partial target assignments. We describe the bidding and winner-determination rules of the resulting sequential single-item auctions and evaluate them experimentally, with surprising results: Larger lookaheads do not improve sequential single-item auctions reliably while only a small number of roll-outs in early rounds already improve them substantially.
Xiaoming Zheng, Sven Koenig, Craig A. Tovey
Added 12 Jun 2010
Updated 12 Jun 2010
Type Conference
Year 2006
Where IROS
Authors Xiaoming Zheng, Sven Koenig, Craig A. Tovey
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