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ATAL
2003
Springer

An incentive compatible reputation mechanism

13 years 9 months ago
An incentive compatible reputation mechanism
Traditional centralised approaches to security are difficult to apply to large, distributed marketplaces in which software agents operate. Developing a notion of trust that is based on the reputation of agents can provide a softer notion of security that is sufficient for many multi-agent applications. In this paper, we address the issue of incentivecompatibility (i.e. how to make it optimal for agents to share reputation information truthfully), by introducing a sidepayment scheme, organised through a set of broker agents, that makes it rational for software agents to truthfully share the reputation information they have acquired in their past experience. We also show how to use a cryptographic mechanism to protect the integrity of reputation information and to achieve a tight binding between the identity and reputation of an agent.
Radu Jurca, Boi Faltings
Added 06 Jul 2010
Updated 06 Jul 2010
Type Conference
Year 2003
Where ATAL
Authors Radu Jurca, Boi Faltings
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