On the (In)security of SNARKs in the Presence of Oracles

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On the (In)security of SNARKs in the Presence of Oracles
In this work we study the feasibility of knowledge extraction for succinct non-interactive arguments of knowledge (SNARKs) in a scenario that, to the best of our knowledge, has not been analyzed before. While prior work focuses on the case of adversarial provers that may receive (statically generated) auxiliary information, here we consider the scenario where adversarial provers are given access to an oracle. For this setting we study if and under what assumptions such provers can admit an extractor. Our contribution is mainly threefold. First, we formalize the question of extraction in the presence of oracles by proposing a suitable proof of knowledge definition for this setting. We call SNARKs satisfying this definition O-SNARKs. Second, we show how to use O-SNARKs to obtain formal and intuitive security proofs for three applications (homomorphic signatures, succinct functional signatures, and SNARKs on authenticated data) where we recognize an issue while doing the proof under the...
Dario Fiore, Anca Nitulescu
Added 03 Apr 2016
Updated 03 Apr 2016
Type Journal
Year 2016
Where IACR
Authors Dario Fiore, Anca Nitulescu
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