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CRYPTO
2010
Springer

Leakage-Resilient Pseudorandom Functions and Side-Channel Attacks on Feistel Networks

8 years 8 months ago
Leakage-Resilient Pseudorandom Functions and Side-Channel Attacks on Feistel Networks
Abstract. A cryptographic primitive is leakage-resilient, if it remains secure even if an adversary can learn a bounded amount of arbitrary information about the computation with every invocation. As a consequence, the physical implementation of a leakage-resilient primitive is secure against every side-channel as long as the amount of information leaked per invocation is bounded. In this paper we prove positive and negative results about the feasibility of constructing leakage-resilient pseudorandom functions and permutations (i.e. block-ciphers). Our results are three fold:
Yevgeniy Dodis, Krzysztof Pietrzak
Added 08 Nov 2010
Updated 08 Nov 2010
Type Conference
Year 2010
Where CRYPTO
Authors Yevgeniy Dodis, Krzysztof Pietrzak
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