Leakage-Resilient Zero Knowledge

11 years 5 months ago
Leakage-Resilient Zero Knowledge
In this paper, we initiate a study of zero knowledge proof systems in the presence of sidechannel attacks. Specifically, we consider a setting where a cheating verifier is allowed to obtain arbitrary bounded leakage on the entire state (including the witness and the random coins) of the prover during the entire protocol execution. We formalize a meaningful definition of leakage-resilient zero knowledge (LR-ZK) proof system, that intuitively guarantees that the protocol does not yield anything beyond the validity of the statement and the leakage obtained by the verifier. We give a construction of LR-ZK interactive proof system based on standard general assumptions. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first instance of a cryptographic interactive protocol where the adversary is allowed to perform leakage attacks during the protocol execution on the entire state of honest party (in contrast, prior work only considered leakage prior to the protocol execution, or very limited le...
Sanjam Garg, Abhishek Jain 0002, Amit Sahai
Added 18 Dec 2011
Updated 18 Dec 2011
Type Journal
Year 2011
Authors Sanjam Garg, Abhishek Jain 0002, Amit Sahai
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