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2015
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Losing Control: On the Effectiveness of Control-Flow Integrity under Stack Attacks

2 years 5 months ago
Losing Control: On the Effectiveness of Control-Flow Integrity under Stack Attacks
Adversaries exploit memory corruption vulnerabilities to hijack a program’s control flow and gain arbitrary code execution. One promising mitigation, control-flow integrity (CFI), has been the subject of extensive research in the past decade. One of the core findings is that adversaries can construct Turing-complete code-reuse attacks against coarsegrained CFI policies because they admit control flows that are not part of the original program. This insight led the research community to focus on fine-grained CFI implementations. In this paper we show how to exploit heap-based vulnerabilities to control the stack contents including securitycritical values used to validate control-flow transfers. Our investigation shows that although program analysis and compiler-based mitigations reduce stack-based vulnerabilities, stack-based memory corruption remains an open problem. Using the Chromium web browser we demonstrate real-world attacks against various CFI implementations: 1) agains...
Mauro Conti, Stephen Crane, Lucas Davi, Michael Fr
Added 17 Apr 2016
Updated 17 Apr 2016
Type Journal
Year 2015
Where CCS
Authors Mauro Conti, Stephen Crane, Lucas Davi, Michael Franz, Per Larsen, Marco Negro, Christopher Liebchen, Mohaned Qunaibit, Ahmad-Reza Sadeghi
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