Lower bounds for collusion-secure fingerprinting

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Lower bounds for collusion-secure fingerprinting
Collusion-secure fingerprinting codes are an important primitive used by many digital watermarking schemes [1, 10, 9]. Boneh and Shaw [3] define a model for these types of codes and present an explicit construction. Their code has length O(c3 log(1/ )) and attains security against coalitions of size c with error. Boneh and Shaw also present a lower bound of Ω(c log(1/c )) on the length of any collusion-secure code. We give new lower bounds on the length of collusion-secure codes by analyzing a weighted coinflipping strategy for the coalition. As an illustration of our methods, we give a simple proof that the BonehShaw construction cannot be asymptotically improved. Next, we prove a general lower bound: no secure code can have length o(c2 log(1/c )), which improves the previous known bound by a factor of c. In particular, we show that any secure code will have length Ω(c2 log(1/c )) as long as log(1/ ) ≥ Kk log c, where K is a constant and k is the number of columns in the cod...
Chris Peikert, Abhi Shelat, Adam Smith
Added 01 Nov 2010
Updated 01 Nov 2010
Type Conference
Year 2003
Where SODA
Authors Chris Peikert, Abhi Shelat, Adam Smith
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