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AAMAS
2011
Springer

Manipulation complexity and gender neutrality in stable marriage procedures

8 years 6 months ago
Manipulation complexity and gender neutrality in stable marriage procedures
The stable marriage problem is a well-known problem of matching men to women so that no man and woman who are not married to each other both prefer each other. Such a problem has a wide variety of practical applications, ranging from matching resident doctors to hospitals to matching students to schools. A well-known algorithm to solve this problem is the Gale-Shapley algorithm, which runs in quadratic time in the number of men/women. It has been proven that stable marriage procedures can always be manipulated. Whilst the Gale-Shapley algorithm is computationally easy to manipulate, we prove that there exist stable marriage procedures which are NP-hard to manipulate. We also consider the relationship between voting theory and stable marriage procedures, showing that voting rules which are NP-hard to manipulate can be used to define stable marriage procedures which are themselves NP-hard to manipulate. Finally, we consider the issue that stable marriage procedures like Gale-Shapley fav...
Maria Silvia Pini, Francesca Rossi, Kristen Brent
Added 12 May 2011
Updated 12 May 2011
Type Journal
Year 2011
Where AAMAS
Authors Maria Silvia Pini, Francesca Rossi, Kristen Brent Venable, Toby Walsh
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