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WINE
2009
Springer

Mechanism Design for Complexity-Constrained Bidders

11 years 8 months ago
Mechanism Design for Complexity-Constrained Bidders
A well-known result due to Vickery gives a mechanism for selling a number of goods to interested buyers in a way that achieves the maximum social welfare. In practice, a problem with this mechanism is that it requires the buyers to specify a large number of values. In this paper we study the problem of designing optimal mechanisms subject to constraints on the complexity of the bidding language in a setting where buyers have additive valuations for a large set of goods. This setting is motivated by sponsored search auctions, where the valuations of the advertisers are more or less additive, and the number of keywords that are up for sale is huge. We give a complete solution for this problem when the valuations of the buyers are drawn from simple classes of prior distributions. For a more realistic class of priors, we show that a mechanism akin to the broad match mechanism currently in use provides a reasonable bicriteria approximation.
Ravi Kumar, Mohammad Mahdian, Amin Sayedi
Added 25 May 2010
Updated 25 May 2010
Type Conference
Year 2009
Where WINE
Authors Ravi Kumar, Mohammad Mahdian, Amin Sayedi
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