Mechanism Design for Preference Aggregation over Coalitions

13 years 10 months ago

Download lia.deis.unibo.it

The aggregation of individuals’ preferences into a single group outcome is both well-studied and fundamental within decision theory. Historically, though, a pervasive simpliﬁcation has been to strip agents of the ability to form coalitions and strategically reveal their intentions. CP techniques can address such possibilities within a restricted socialchoice framework that represents mechanisms for aggregating preferences as decision trees; the internal nodes are labeled by various individuals, and the leaves represent outcomes that arise from the ﬂow of individual decisions down the various branches of the tree. Currently, a highly simpliﬁed version of the language allows the automatic generation of such trees meeting user-speciﬁed properties, using a standard CSP-solver. By further enrichments within a more specialized reasoning framework, the eventual goal is to circumvent negative theoretical theorems concerning preference aggregation, by exploiting the combination of coa...

Eric I. Hsu, Sheila A. McIlraith

Real-time Traffic