Sciweavers

CORR
2006
Springer

Modeling Adversaries in a Logic for Security Protocol Analysis

13 years 3 months ago
Modeling Adversaries in a Logic for Security Protocol Analysis
Logics for security protocol analysis require the formalization of an adversary model that specifies the capabilities of adversaries. A common model is the Dolev-Yao model, which considers only adversaries that can compose and replay messages, and decipher them with known keys. The Dolev-Yao model is abstraction, but it suffers from some drawbacks: it cannot handle the adversary knowing protocol-specific information, and it cannot handle probabilistic notions, such as the adversary attempting to guess the keys. We show how we can analyze security protocols under different adversary models by using a logic with a notion of algorithmic knowledge. Roughly speaking, adversaries are assumed to use algorithms to compute their knowledge; adversary capabilities are captured by suitable restrictions on the algorithms used. We show how we can model the standard Dolev-Yao adversary in this setting, and how we can capture more general capabilities including protocol-specific knowledge and guesses....
Joseph Y. Halpern, Riccardo Pucella
Added 11 Dec 2010
Updated 11 Dec 2010
Type Journal
Year 2006
Where CORR
Authors Joseph Y. Halpern, Riccardo Pucella
Comments (0)