Sciweavers

Share
ASIACRYPT
2005
Springer

Modular Security Proofs for Key Agreement Protocols

12 years 7 months ago
Modular Security Proofs for Key Agreement Protocols
The security of key agreement protocols has traditionally been notoriously hard to establish. In this paper we present a modular approach to the construction of proofs of security for a large class of key agreement protocols. By following a modular approach to proof construction, we hope to enable simpler and less error-prone analysis and proof generation for such key agreement protocols. The technique is compatible with Bellare-Rogaway style models as well as the more recent models of Bellare et al. and Canetti and Krawczyk. In particular, we show how the use of a decisional oracle can aid the construction of proofs of security for this class of protocols and how the security of these protocols commonly reduces to some form of Gap assumption.
Caroline Kudla, Kenneth G. Paterson
Added 26 Jun 2010
Updated 26 Jun 2010
Type Conference
Year 2005
Where ASIACRYPT
Authors Caroline Kudla, Kenneth G. Paterson
Comments (0)
books